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I.

INTRODUCTION

In October 1998, Massachusetts police pulled over Michael Hyde for
seemingly no reason.1 During the stop, Hyde secretly recorded his
dialogue with the officers, and later offered the recording as evidence to
bolster a formal complaint with the department based on the conduct of the
stopping officers.2 The recording was evidence of a crime, but the crime
was Hyde’s violation of the Massachusetts wiretapping statute.3 Initially, a
clerk-magistrate refused the police’s request for a criminal complaint
against Hyde, but after a show cause hearing a state district court issued the
criminal complaint.4
In another 2005 incident, Massachusetts police conducted a warrantless
search of Paul Pechonis’s home after arresting him on a misdemeanor
charge.5 Unbeknownst to the officers, a hidden “nanny cam” captured
audio and video of the entire arrest and search.6 Pechonis turned over the
surreptitiously recorded video to Mary Jean, who proceeded to post the
video on her website.7 Although the First Amendment ultimately protected
1. See Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 964-65 (Mass. 2001) (recounting
how officers ordered Hyde and his passenger out of the car, searched them and the
vehicle, had a heated conversation with Hyde involving an exchange of profanities, and
eventually let Hyde go with only a verbal warning for noisy exhaust and an unlit
license plate).
2. See id. at 965 (reporting that Hyde went to the police six days after the stop,
formally complained about his treatment and about not knowing any potential
implications for wiretapping laws, and turned over the tape recording “to substantiate
his allegations”).
3. See id. (reporting that an internal investigation of the officers ultimately
exonerated them of any misconduct, while the Abington police sought a criminal
complaint against the defendant for four counts of wiretapping).
4. See id. (recounting that the same judge that ordered that the criminal complaint
issue also denied Hyde’s motion to dismiss).
5. See Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 25 (1st Cir. 2007) (recounting that
on September 29, 2005, eight state police troopers met Pechonis at his front door and
handcuffed him with his consent before the warrantless search occurred).
6. See id. (noting that, although disputed, it was immaterial to the decision as to
whether the motion sensors activated the nanny cam or it was intentionally switched
on).
7. See id. (explaining that Jean was a local political activist who maintained a
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Jean’s publication, Pechonis’s recording had broken Massachusetts law.8
In Maryland, motorcycle aficionado Anthony Graber was speeding when
a gun-waving undercover police officer pulled him over.9 Graber happened
to be wearing a helmet-mounted camera that captured video of the officer’s
initial reaction to Graber’s speeding and of the officer issuing a speeding
citation.10 Graber subsequently posted the video on YouTube, which days
later resulted in armed police at his door for his arrest.11 Hyde, Pechonis,
and Graber all have one thing in common: by taping their experiences of
law enforcement misconduct, they all inadvertently ran afoul of state
wiretapping laws.12 The trend of criminally charging citizens who have
recorded police officers is not unique to Massachusetts and Maryland; any
state where wiretapping laws require unanimous consent could feasibly
charge its citizens for similar actions.13
Criminalizing wiretapping is not a new legal concept, but rather a natural
evolution of the common law prohibition on eavesdropping, as well as a
governmental recognition that electronic surveillance requires regulation.14
Legislatures generally enact wiretapping statutes with the dual intent of
protecting citizens’ privacy and enabling police to combat organized crime
efficiently.15 However, using wiretapping laws to send a message that the
state does not want citizens documenting officers’ on-duty activities is
becoming more frequent.16
website criticizing the former District Attorney for Worshester County, Massachusetts).
8. See id. (recounting that Massachusetts State Police sent Jean a cease and desist
letter after she posted the video, claiming that she had violated the wiretapping statute
and was therefore subject to felony prosecution).
9. See David Rittgers, Maryland Wiretapping Law Needs an Update, BALTIMORE
SUN (June 1, 2010),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-06-01/news/bs-edmaryland-wiretapping-20100601_1_wiretapping-search-warrant-mr-graber (detailing
the story of Anthony Graber and arguing that this particular use of wiretapping laws is
strongly contrary to the public good).
10. See id. (noting that Graber never contested his citation for speeding).
11. See id. (recalling how armed police officers came to Graber’s house in the early
morning hours, seized Graber’s computer equipment, and detained his mother and
sister for over an hour, preventing them from going to work and school).
12. See generally Jean, 492 F.3d at 25 (stating that Jean’s posting of the recording
was protected speech despite the fact that the recording was likely obtained illegally);
Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Mass. 2001) (charging Hyde with
violation of MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2010)); Rittgers, supra note 9
(detailing how Graber faces up to five years in prison and, potentially, a $10,000 fine).
13. See Rittgers, supra note 9 (discussing how Maryland is among a dozen states
with this stricter requirement written into their wiretapping laws).
14. See Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1266 (2004) (explaining that, although surveillance can help
solve and prevent crimes, surveillance has dangerous implications for freedom and
democracy and therefore warrants control).
15. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2157 (1967)
(stating that combating organized crime is the major purpose of Title III).
16. See Dina Mishra, Comment, Undermining Excessive Privacy for Police:
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This Comment argues that citizens should not have to fear reprisal for
recording a police officer in public and that legislation is necessary to
correct the practice of using wiretapping statutes to arrest and prosecute
citizens engaged in such activity.17 Part II of this Comment explores the
development of the modern right to privacy.18 Part II also gives a brief
review of current wiretapping statutes.19 Part III argues that all wiretapping
statutes should have an expectation of privacy requirement, and that onduty police officers have a diminished expectation of privacy because they
are acting in their capacity as public officials.20 Part III also argues that
unanimous consent laws burden First Amendment rights in various forms.21
Part IV suggests possible solutions to these policy problems.22 Finally, Part
V concludes that citizens’ First Amendment rights outweigh police
officers’ expectations of privacy and that change is wholly necessary.23
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Right to Privacy
Although Americans enjoy a fundamental right to privacy, the word

Citizen Tape Recording to Check Police Officers’ Power, 117 YALE L.J. 1549, 1558
n.9 (2008) (listing recent arrests for police taping in Pennsylvania, Florida, and New
Hampshire).
17. See generally Matthew D. Thurlow, Lights, Camera, Action: Video Cameras as
Tools of Justice, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 771, 806-13 (2005) (arguing
that video recording’s role in the administration of justice is becoming more important
as technology advances); Mishra, supra note 16, at 1550 (agreeing that the current
ability of states to prosecute citizens for recording police misconduct is untenable and
requires constructive change).
18. See infra Part II (exploring how the modern right of privacy has arisen from the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution).
19. See infra Part II (explaining how federal law currently handles the prohibition
on wiretapping, as well as how different states approach the issue with their own
legislation).
20. See infra Part III (establishing that legislators did not intend to have
wiretapping laws used to prosecute citizens for recording officers, and combining court
decisions recognizing that a police officer is a public official and other decisions
expounding on how public officials acting in their public capacity typically have a
diminished expectation of privacy to show a lessened expectation of privacy for onduty police officers).
21. See infra Part III (showing that wiretapping laws can burden the First
Amendment right to gather information on matters of public importance and potentially
burden the right to petition for redress of grievances).
22. See infra Part IV (arguing that permitting surreptitious recording of on-duty
police officers is the most effective solution to the untenable practice of prosecuting
citizens for recording police and offering several less intrusive measures that aim to
protect a police officer’s privacy expectation).
23. See infra Part V (concluding that federal legislation explicitly permitting secret
recording of police officers acting in their official capacities is necessary considering
the direction in which unanimous consent states are heading).
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The
“privacy” cannot be found anywhere in the Constitution.24
Constitution does not facially describe the right to privacy, but the right has
emerged from between the lines of the Fourth Amendment, and it has taken
years of judicial rhetoric and more than a few violations of citizens’
privacy expectations to find the right in its modern state.25
1.

The Katz Test

The modern right to privacy first emerged in the landmark decision Katz
v. United States.26 In a highly quoted passage, the Supreme Court held that
the Fourth Amendment “protects people not places” and overturned
Olmstead v. United States.27 Olmstead had previously interpreted the
Fourth Amendment as requiring a physical search or seizure for privacy to
be violated.28 Shortly after Katz, the Supreme Court struck down a New
York surveillance statute; the wiretapping statute gave police free reign to
record an individual up to six days and did not require specifics as to what
police were looking for.29 Articulated in Katz, the modern test for whether
a right to privacy has been violated is twofold.30 First, the person alleging
the violation must have a subjective expectation of privacy.31 Second, the
expectation of privacy must be one that society is willing to consider

24. Accord U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING
PRIVACY 1, 2 (2008) (asserting that not only does the word “privacy” not appear
anywhere in the Fourth Amendment, from which the right to privacy largely derives,
but it also does not appear anywhere in the entirety of the Constitution).
25. See generally Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44 (1967) (holding
unconstitutional a New York electronic surveillance statute because of the broad power
it afforded police in invading privacy rights); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967) (reversing Olmstead and ruling that a warrantless wiretapping violates the
Fourth Amendment); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455-70 (1928) (finding
no violation of the Fourth Amendment in warrantless wiretapping of a phone call).
26. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (holding that a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in phone booth conversations).
27. See id. at 351. Contra Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 (holding that, based on the
plain language of the Fourth Amendment, police tapping of telephone wires was not a
type of search or seizure contemplated by the Fourth Amendment).
28. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (pointing to language in Olmstead that concluded
wiretapping telephones to gather conversations was not a physical search or seizure and
therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
29. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 44 (characterizing New York’s statute as “too broad”
and deeming the conduct it permits as a “trespassory intrusion” into an area the
Constitution protects).
30. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-63 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (articulating the
now adopted two-pronged test, which requires that a person have a subjective
expectation of privacy and that the expectation be one that society considers
reasonable). See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (adopting the
currently recognized two-pronged test for expectation of privacy).
31. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46 (finding no expectation of privacy where police
used a pen register to capture numbers dialed into a telephone).
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objectively reasonable.32
2.

Public Officials Acting in Official Capacity

The test the Court articulated in Katz does not definitively set the
boundaries for expectations of privacy, and other courts have unexpectedly
found diminished or nonexistent expectations of privacy.33 For example,
state courts have found that there is a diminished expectation of privacy for
public officials acting in their official capacities.34 Certain state courts
have determined that police officers are public officials for the purposes of
expectations of privacy, and thus the lowered expectation applies.35
Another vehicle through which courts have found lessened expectations
of privacy is the “open field” doctrine, which holds that a person has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in something left in view of the public or,
in other words, what someone “knowingly exposes” to the public.36
Applying the open field doctrine, certain courts have ruled that comments
police officers make in the course of their public duties are comments that
have been knowingly exposed to the public.37
B. A History of Wiretapping Law
1.

The Federal Wiretapping Statute

In 1968, Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act to govern the interception of wire communications and

32. See id. at 742 (holding that it would be unreasonable to recognize an
expectation of privacy here because the dialed numbers are openly transmitted to the
phone company when the call is connected).
33. See O’Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 (1st Cir. 1976) (holding that
mandatory disclosure of financial records did not violate the police officers’ privacy
rights because police are held to a higher standard of accountability, which includes a
lessened privacy expectation).
34. See State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a
police officer had no expectation of privacy in a conversation that took place during an
arrest because the conversation occurred in public where passersby could easily
overhear).
35. See Rotkiewicz v. Sadowsky, 730 N.E.2d 282, 287 (Mass. 2000) (concluding
that a police officer is a “public official” because of the broad powers invested in
officers, the high potential for abuse of these powers, and their high impact and
visibility within the community).
36. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect from a search what a person “knowingly exposes to the
public,” even if this exposure occurs in a person’s own home or office); see also
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 445 (1989) (holding that the defendant had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in a trailer, the contents of which were visible via
naked-eye aerial observation).
37. See Flora, 845 P.2d at 1358 (finding that comments made during a routine
traffic stop are exposed to the public).
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other enumerated communications.38 In the wake of Katz, Congress drafted
Title III carefully so that it would comply with the Supreme Court’s prior
holdings on the issue of electronic surveillance.39 According to the
Supreme Court, Title III aims “to prohibit, on the pain of criminal and civil
penalties, all interception of oral and wire communications, except those
specifically provided for in the Act.”40 Before Title III, the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 was the law governing all forms of
wiretapping, but Congress felt that a law with more thorough privacy
protection was necessary.41 Concerned that Title III could not adequately
provide for advances in the technology of wiretapping and eavesdropping,
Congress amended Title III in 1986.42
Today, Title III generally prohibits, with some exceptions, both private
and state electronic surveillance.43 For law enforcement to legally record a
conversation under Title III, there must either be a warrant obtained in
good faith for the recording and either at least one party must consent to the
recording or one party must lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
conversation.44

38. Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22
(2006); see S. REP. NO. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153
(arguing the need for electronic surveillance legislation and regulation to protect
citizen’s privacy and allow police to fight organized crime).
39. See also Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 250 n. 9 (1979) (recognizing
Congress’s approval of the Court’s finding that electronic surveillance can pose a large
threat to privacy).
40. See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 514 (1974) (noting that the act
provides exceptions for interceptions that law enforcement officers make based on a
court order and in furtherance of an investigation of one of an enumerated list of
serious crimes).
41. See Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 48 (1972) (suggesting that
protection of privacy was a large concern in the enactment of Title III); see also S. REP.
NO. 90-1097, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153 (stating that Title III was
written to comport with the constitutional standards articulated in Berger and Katz);
Daniel R. Dinger, Should Parents Be Allowed to Record a Child’s Telephone
Conversation When They Believe the Child is in Danger?: An Examination of the
Federal Wiretap Statute and the Doctrine of Vicarious Consent in the Context of
Criminal Prosecution, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 955, 958 (2005) (positing that concerns
surrounding the Federal Communications Act’s failure to properly protect citizens’
privacy rights were a motivating factor in Title III’s enactment).
42. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22
(2006) (expounding the modern version of the federal wiretapping statute).
43. See generally §§ 2511, 2516 (listing the foundational requirements for an
interception to be unlawful and giving specific excepted circumstances).
44. See § 2511(2)(a)(ii)(A) (detailing the warrant exception); § 2511(2)(d) (setting
forth the one party consent exception); § 2510(2) (providing that the statute protects
oral communications if a person has a reasonable expectation that a communication is
not subject to interception and circumstances justify that expectation); United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (explaining that when law enforcement obtains a
warrant in good faith, suppression of evidence found pursuant to the warrant is
inappropriate even if the warrant is subsequently deemed invalid).
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State Wiretapping Statutes

If a state chooses to enact a wiretapping law, the law must be at least as
restrictive as the federal law, but may be more restrictive.45 Forty-nine
states have anti-wiretapping laws.46 Like the federal wiretapping statute,
the majority of these statutes permit recordings when only one party has
consented.47 Thirteen state wiretapping laws have a unanimous consent or
knowledge requirement.48 Those requirements mean that, to record any
conversation, both parties being recorded must either give their express
consent to the recording or know about the recording.49
Massachusetts’s law is arguably the strictest because police and
prosecutors can (and do) use the wiretapping laws to arrest and prosecute
citizens for making an audio recording of police officers.50 Courts have
consistently interpreted Massachusetts’s statute as prohibiting the creation
of all forms of secret records by the public.51 The statute does not provide
an explicit exception for circumstances in which there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy.52
In most jurisdictions, video recording alone will not trigger the
application of these wiretapping statutes, as it is the audio recording that is

45. See Commonwealth v. Vitello, 327 N.E.2d 819, 833 (Mass. 1975) (explaining
that Title III sets a minimum standard of restrictiveness in wiretapping statutes that no
state can lower).
46. See Dinger, supra note 41, at 965 n.58 (noting that Vermont is the only state
without a wiretapping statute).
47. Id. at 965 n.59.
48. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
1335(a) (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03 (West 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§711-1111 (LexisNexis 2010); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-2 (West 2010); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-4001 (West 2010); MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2010);
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §10-402 (West 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
750.539c-d (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213(1)(c) (West 2009); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2 (West 2010); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5704(4) (West 2010);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030 (West 2010).
49. See Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 966 (Mass. 2001) (recognizing
that one functional difference between the Massachusetts wiretapping statute and Title
III is that Title III’s definition of an “oral communication” requires an expectation of
privacy, while the Massachusetts statute seems clear in its definition of “oral
communication” in that it does not require a privacy expectation).
50. See, e.g, Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 25 (1st Cir. 2007)
(mentioning that Pechonis’s recording of his encounter with police misconduct was
illegal, although the case deals with charges against Jean for dissemination of the
recording); Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 967 (opining that the Massachusetts legislature
designed the wiretapping statute to be stricter than comparable statutes in other states).
51. See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 966-67 (holding that all recordings violate the statute
because the legislature intended to “strictly prohibit all secret recordings by members
of the public” and Hyde’s surreptitious recording of the police officers who pulled him
over fits into this category).
52. See id. at 971 (noting that the statute does not contemplate privacy
expectations).
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illegal.53 However, with the progression of technology, nearly every video
recording device (from cell phones to point-and-shoot digital cameras) has
an audio component.54 Police in some jurisdictions simply ask amateur
videographers if the videographers’ recording device captures audio and
then immediately arrest the videographer when he or she affirmatively
responds.55 Yet, courts in other jurisdictions have held that their respective
wiretapping statutes do not criminalize this amateur videography.56 Courts
sometimes do this by finding an implicit expectation of privacy
requirement for police officers.57
C. The First Amendment Rights of Public Officials
Aside from granting the commonly known rights to freedom of speech
and assembly, the First Amendment also protects the right to gather
information about public officials’ activities on public property.58 In
Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Supreme Court held that, when public employees
make statements pursuant to their official duties, those statements do not
receive the same First Amendment protections as they would if made by
private citizens.59 Furthermore, the Court has determined that the right to
gather information of public importance outweighs potential wiretapping
53. See Commonwealth v. Wright, 814 N.E.2d 741, 742 n.1 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004)
(observing that although sound recordings are prohibited, there is “no express statutory
prohibition” against visual recordings).
54. See Ric Simmons, Why 2007 is Not Like 1984: A Broader Perspective on
Technology’s Effect on Privacy and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 97 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 531, 532 (2007) (explaining that, as in Orwell’s chilling dystopia,
video cameras are everywhere, but unlike Orwell’s vision the citizen masses wield
them in cell phones).
55. See David Rowinski, Police Fight Cellphone Recordings, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan.
12, 2010) (recounting the story of a lawyer who recorded police brutality on his cell
phone, only to be arrested for wiretapping violation after he informed an officer he
recorded that his phone recorded audio).
56. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Cummings, 212 F.3d 1332, 1332 (11th Cir. 2000)
(holding that plaintiffs had First Amendment right to photograph or videotape police
conduct, subject to reasonable time, manner, and place restrictions); People v.
Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346, 348 (Ill. 1986) (ruling that a wiretapping statute violation
was not meant to apply in a situation where officers conversed in the presence of a
suspect in custody and therefore had no expectation of privacy).
57. See generally Malpas v. State, 695 A.2d 588, 595 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997)
(holding that wiretap violation requires jury determination on reasonable expectation of
privacy).
58. See Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333 (holding that the right to record matters of public
interest granted by the First Amendment does allow for recording of police conduct);
Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that a genuine
issue of material fact existed as to whether plaintiff’s arrest on wiretapping charges
interfered with his First Amendment right to gather news).
59. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 411-12 (2006) (finding a district
attorney was not speaking as a citizen and therefore had a lessened First Amendment
right when he was reprimanded for a memorandum written pursuant to his official
duties).
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violations when lawfully accessing and disseminating illegally intercepted
information.60
III. ANALYSIS
A. Courts Should Find an Implicit Privacy Requirement in Unanimous
Consent Wiretapping Statutes When Used to Charge Citizens for Recording
On-Duty Police Officers.
Although the Fourth Amendment only limits the actions of state and
federal actors against private citizens, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is
instructive in defining expectations of privacy in cases in which citizens
tape police officers, and deciding when these expectations have been
violated.61 Thus, to address the issue of a police officer’s privacy in the
context of Massachusetts and other states’ wiretapping statutes, the statutes
must first require an expectation of privacy.62 Federal courts have
interpreted the use of the term “oral communication” in Title III to require
that a speaker have a justifiable expectation of privacy in a communication
for the statute to cover it.63
Two issues arise when determining whether applicable state wiretapping
laws cover communications with police officers in routine interactions with
the public. The first is whether the statute only applies when the police
officers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in words they utter during
a traffic stop or any other interaction with the public in their official
capacity.64 Even Massachusetts courts assert that public officials’ status
lessens the expectations of privacy of public officials.65 The second issue
60. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 515 (2001) (holding no violation of
relevant wiretapping law because the information was obtained lawfully and was a
matter of public concern, even though respondents had reason to know the
communication was intercepted illegally).
61. See Howard A. Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision: Video and the Future of Civil
Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REV. 600, 609-10 (2009) (discussing the Fourth
Amendment’s protection of individual privacy rights and relating it to examples of
states bringing actions for some violation of police officers’ privacy).
62. See Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 968 n.6 (Mass. 2001)
(explaining that since the statute broadly prohibits the interception of speech in general,
the officer’s expectation of privacy was irrelevant).
63. See id. at 965 (stating that Hyde argued that the court should look to the federal
statute by analogy in interpreting the Massachusetts statute).
64. See id. at 975 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that because police are held
to higher standards of conduct, they have lower expectations of privacy); O’Connor v.
Police Comm’r of Boston, 557 N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (indicating
that police officers are generally held to higher standards than citizens); People v.
Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346, 350 (Ill. 1986) (holding that the important factors of the
Illinois eavesdropping statute are whether the officers intended their conversation to be
private and if that intent was reasonable).
65. See O’Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 (1st Cir. 1976) (balancing the
police officers’ privacy expectations and the public interest, and finding that the public
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concerns the circumstances that are required to give rise to this expectation
of privacy, assuming police are even required to have a privacy
expectation.66 Without a loss of generality, the focus can narrow to only
the states in which wiretapping laws require unanimous consent, with a
specific focus on Massachusetts and Maryland, as no issue arises when the
consent of the recorder satisfies a single party consent requirement.67
B. Courts Should Analogize to the Federal Wiretapping Statute When
Interpreting State Wiretapping Laws.
The phrase “private conversation” is not used in the federal wiretapping
statute.68
According to the Maryland wiretapping law, an “oral
communication” is “any conversation or words spoken to or by a person in
a private conversation.”69 Conversely, the federal law defines “oral
communication” as “any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting
an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying such expectation.”70 The federal law has been
construed as only applying to situations where the individual uttering the
oral communication has a reasonable expectation of privacy in that
communication.71
Maryland courts have properly determined that, because of the Maryland
interest outweighed the officers’ expectations of privacy); Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 972-77
(Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that reduced privacy for public officials holds
them more accountable, which is necessary to protect the public against illegitimate
exercises of power); Rotkiewicz v. Sadowsky, 730 N.E.2d 282, 285 (Mass. 2000)
(defining a police officer as a public official for purposes of interpreting statutory
language).
66. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-64 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (articulating the modern standard of subjective reasonableness, and
society’s acceptance as reasonable, for when a person has an expectation of privacy);
State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (articulating one of the situations
lacking an expectation of privacy, namely, in conversations that take place in public
places where they can be easily overheard).
67. See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 967 (detailing how Massachusetts’s wiretapping law
was revised from a one-party consent law to be more strict because of a concern for the
increasing commercial availability of devices that could secretly intercept oral and wire
communications).
68. See Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22
(2006); Letter from Robert N. MacDonald, Chief Counsel Ops. & Advice, Md. Office
of the Attorney Gen., to Samuel I. Rosenberg, Md. State Delegate (July 7, 2010) at 5
(on file with author) (explaining, by comparison to the Maryland statute, how privacy
is found in the federal statute despite the absence of any specific reference to a private
conversation).
69. MD. CODE. ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-401(2)(i) (West 2010).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2).
71. See United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839, 849-55 (4th Cir. 1979)
(determining, for the purposes of the federal wiretapping statute, that I.R.S. agents had
a reasonable expectation of privacy when surreptitiously recorded in the defendant’s
bank, which they had been occupying to conduct an audit).
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and federal statutes’ similarities, the language of the Maryland statute
incorporates the reasonable expectation of privacy standard derived from
the federal law.72 This reasonable expectation of privacy standard should
be incorporated into all state wiretapping laws because not doing so creates
a great potential for misuse of the law against citizens, as happened in
Hyde.73
C. Courts That Have Not Found Privacy Requirements in Wiretapping
Statutes are Wrong Because They Have Incorrectly Construed Statutory
Language and Misinterpreted Legislative Intent.
The majority in Hyde misapplies the Massachusetts wiretapping statute
in holding Michael Hyde criminally liable because it ignores judicial
precedent and misinterprets legislative intent.74 There is no doubt that the
Massachusetts wiretapping statute is stricter than the wiretapping statutes
of most states, as the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts points out.75
However, the Court inaccurately explained the reasons for the disparity
between Massachusetts’ wiretapping statutes and other states’ wiretapping
statues.76 Decisions by other Massachusetts courts show that the statute’s
intent was not to prosecute private citizens for surreptitiously recording
police officers, but instead, the statute was meant to protect private citizens
from state actors and other private citizens.77
The Massachusetts statute makes it illegal to record people without their

72. See Malpas v. State, 695 A.2d 588, 595-96 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997)
(determining whether a violation of the wiretapping statute occurred requires a jury
determination that some involved party had a reasonable expectation of privacy). See
generally Letter from Robert N. MacDonald to Samuel I. Rosenberg, supra note 68, at
5 (explaining how courts have characterized the difference between the federal and
Maryland statutes’ definition of “oral communication” as “slight,” and requiring the
same privacy standard under Maryland law as federal law requires).
73. See Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 972 (Mass. 2001) (Marshall,
C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the legislature enacted the statute with the intention of
protecting the privacy rights of citizens, not as a weapon to prosecute citizens in similar
situations).
74. See id. at 972 (discussing legislative history and determining that using the
statute to criminally prosecute citizens in these situations directly contradicts the
legislators’ intention to protect citizens from police abuse of wiretapping).
75. See id. at 967 (relating that when it amended the statute in 1968, the
commission intended to create an electronic surveillance statute that was more
restrictive than those in other states).
76. See id. at 972-74 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (expounding that the two-fold
intention of the statute was to authorize and regulate the government’s use of electronic
surveillance and to protect the privacy of citizens by regulating nongovernmental
surveillance).
77. See Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 424 N.E.2d 250, 255 (Mass. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1147 (1982) (acknowledging that the legislature had great concern for the
privacy rights of citizens and was hesitant to add an exception enabling police to use
wiretapping to combat organized crime).
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consent regardless of the location of the recording.78 The statute defines
“interception” as “to secretly hear, secretly record, or aid another to
secretly hear or secretly record the contents of any wire or oral
communication through the use of any intercepting device by any person
other than a person given prior authority by all parties to such a
communication.”79 Any person who commits, attempts to commit, or even
“procures any other person to commit an interception” may be punished
with a fine of up to ten thousand dollars, imprisonment for up to five years,
or both.80 It also states that any individual who “willfully discloses or
attempts to disclose to any person the contents of any wire or oral
communication, knowing that the information was obtained through
interception . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”81 Additionally, the
statute prohibits “permit[ting] . . . participat[ing] in a conspiracy to
commit,” or serving as an “accessory” to any other violations of section
99.82 The majority in Hyde wrongly concludes that the statute lacks
privacy language, and therefore, does not provide an expectation of privacy
requirement, as the statute specifically provides a civil remedy for
“aggrieved” persons who have “standing to complain that . . . his privacy
was invaded in the course of an interception.”83
Similarly, in Maryland, the wiretapping law does not regulate video
recording alone and must include an audio communication for a violation
to occur.84
The Maryland wiretapping law specifically regulates
interception of oral, wire, or electronic communication, and, since a typical
encounter between a private citizen and a police officer does not implicate
wire or electronic communication, the relevant analysis hinges on whether
an “oral communication” between an officer and citizen is protected by the
act.85 Like the Massachusetts statute, the Maryland statute governing
wiretapping is more stringent than federal wiretapping law because it

78. See Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 25 (1st Cir. 2007) (suggesting that
the wiretapping law applied to Pechonis, who recorded police officers conducting an
illegal search in his own home).
79. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(B)(4) (West 2010).
80. § 99(C)(1).
81. § 99(C)(3).
82. § 99(C)(6).
83. §§ 99(B)(6), 99(Q).
84. See Ricks v. State, 537 A.2d 612, 614, 617 (Md. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that
although the Maryland wiretapping act is more restrictive than its federal counterpart,
there is nothing in either act that affects the legality of visual recording). See generally
Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining that due to the
Massachusetts statute’s limitation to “wire and oral communications,” Jean’s video of
police officers would not violate the statute were she to remove the audio portion).
85. Letter from Robert N. MacDonald to Samuel I. Rosenberg, supra note 68, at 4.
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requires all-party consent.86
As with any legal issue, there are several ways to analyze the
Massachusetts wiretapping law’s application to Hyde and other similar
circumstances, and all of them inevitably lead to the conclusion that the law
was not meant to apply to private citizens who record on-duty police
officers.87 The majority opinion bases its argument on a plain text reading
of the statutory language, commenting several times that the statute makes
no mention of exceptions for citizens secretly recording on-duty police
officers or for when there is no expectation of privacy.88 Since the statute
does contain enumerated exceptions, the implication is that the legislature
anticipated every possible applicable circumstance for the statute and
intended only the exceptions appearing therein.89 While the majority
refuses to read implicit language into the statute, it engages in just such a
reading when it assumes the legislature meant to conflate consent with
knowledge, and interprets the unanimous consent requirement of the statute
to mean that if Hyde had simply held the recorder in plain view then he
would have been free of criminal culpability.90
D. Courts That Have Used Wiretapping Statutes to Prosecute Citizens
Who Record On-Duty Police Officers Have Failed to Follow Persuasive
Precedent.
The Washington Court of Appeals addressed circumstances similar to
those in Hyde and came to the opposite conclusion.91 The Washington
appellate court rejected the idea that the wiretapping law was “a sword
available for use against individuals by public officers acting in their
86. Richard P. Gilbert, A Diagnosis, Dissection, and Prognosis of Maryland’s New
Wiretap and Electronic Surveillance Law, 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 183, 192 (1979)
(suggesting that the Maryland statute is “considerably more inclusive” than its federal
counterpart because of Maryland requires consent of all parties and the federal statute
only requires single party consent).
87. See also Commonwealth v. Voight, 556 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990)
(suggesting that a public official acting in public capacity may not be a “person” for the
purpose of statutory grievances). See generally Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d
963, 972 (Mass. 2001) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (arguing for an exception where
participants have no reasonable expectation of privacy).
88. See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 966 (agreeing with the Commonwealth that Hyde’s
assertion that the officer had no expectation of privacy in the conversation Hyde
recorded was irrelevant since the statute lacks any exceptions for situations involving
privacy expectations).
89. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(D) (West 2010) (listing several
exceptions to the prohibition, including interceptions made pursuant to a warrant and
for institutions that record telephone conversations in the ordinary course of business).
90. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 971.
91. See generally State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)
(overturning a conviction under a Washington statute that prohibits the recording of
private conversations because Flora recorded his arrest on the side of a public
thoroughfare, with a third party present, and in sight and hearing of passersby).
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official capacity,” despite the fact that Washington also has a unanimous
consent wiretapping statute very similar to Massachusetts’s statute.92
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts also cites Illinois
precedent in its decision against Hyde, and once again the Court
misinterprets the rule of law.93 In People v. Beardsley, the Illinois Supreme
Court reversed a conviction based on Illinois wiretapping laws because
police officers were aware that the defendant was in a position to overhear
their conversation and therefore not a private conversation as required by
the Illinois statute.94 The majority in Hyde erroneously implies that
because the Illinois legislature amended the statute after the Beardsley
decision, this diminishes the case’s persuasive value. In fact, the majority
makes no effort to explain why the existence of such an amendment would
mean the principles of statutory interpretation employed by the Beardsley
court were not proper.95
The court in Hyde holds that it does not need to address the issue of
whether an interest in, or expectation of, privacy exists because the
Massachusetts statute does not make an exception for when such an
expectation is present.96 The Massachusetts Court misinterprets the statute
as it is specifically intended to protect “aggrieved person[s]” whose
“privacy was invaded in the course of an interception . . . .”97 Moreover,
even if the officers had an expectation of privacy, Massachusetts precedent
suggests that police officers are potentially not “persons” entitled to such
statutory protection without express designation, and no such expression
exists here.98 Although the majority in Hyde thinks that it would be an
injustice to not interpret the statute using the plain meaning of the words on
92. See id. at 1358 (holding that since the arrest was not in any way private, the
officers could not have considered their words private).
93. See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 970 n.10 (citing People v. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346
(Ill. 1986)) (discussing Beardsley, in which a defendant appealed from an
eavesdropping conviction, and noting that the case is pertinent despite not being
mentioned by either party).
94. See Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d at 350 (reasoning that the legislature must have
intended to allow secret recordings of non-private conversations under the
eavesdropping statute despite the plain language of the statute prohibiting recording
any part of a conversation without consent).
95. See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 970, 970 n.10 (stating its intention to avoid “craft[ing]
unwarranted judicial exceptions” and citing Beardsley and the subsequent amendment
to the Illinois statute without explicitly stating its purpose for doing so).
96. See id. at 966 (providing a list of all the statutory exceptions and noting the
absence of any exception for a private individual recording a police officer in the
“carefully worded and unambiguous” statute).
97. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(B)(6) (West 2010) (emphasis
added).
98. See Commonwealth v. Voight, 556 N.E.2d 115, 117 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990)
(suggesting that public employees acting in their official capacity could fail to be
deemed “persons” under the statute, although the court did not explicitly address the
issue).
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the page, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that courts
should not reach a result that plainly contradicts legislative intent, and
using the statute in situations like Hyde opens the door for many
unintended applications.99
E. Police Have a Diminished Expectation of Privacy While On-Duty
Because of Their Status as Public Officials and Their Knowing Exposure of
Interactions with the Public.
The U.S. Supreme Court gives some weight to the idea that it is unlikely
that police have any reasonable expectation of privacy during traffic
stops.100 In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Supreme Court ruled that when public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and therefore the
Constitution does not protect their communications.101 It does not seem
far-fetched, then, to reason that public employees acting in the their public
capacity should have diminished rights in the same way that public
employees speaking in their official capacity have diminished rights.102
Police officers are entitled to some degree of privacy, but even
Massachusetts has recognized that officers’ level of entitlement is probably
less than that of private citizens.103 Additionally, in New Jersey the courts
have consistently held that police officers have a lesser expectation of
privacy because of their status as police officers.104 The New Jersey
99. See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 666 N.E.2d 122, 134 (Mass. 1996)
(acknowledging that a literal reading of the wiretapping statute could criminalize the
recording of police booking procedures, but declining to read the wiretapping statute
literally as doing so literally would go against the perceived intention of the statute).
100. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438 (1984) (noting that the typical
traffic stop is at least somewhat public because passersby on foot or in other cars are
privy to the interaction between the police officer and motorist).
101. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 410 (2006) (determining that the
analysis hinged on whether the employee was speaking as a citizen on a matter of
public concern).
102. Cf. id. at 410-12 (holding that when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties the Constitution does not protect them from employer
discipline).
103. See Guiney v. Police Comm’r, 582 N.E.2d 523, 528 (Mass. 1991) (citing
several Massachusetts statutes that reflect the unique nature of the law enforcement
officer as a public official whose power over the public creates a greater potential for
abuse and misconduct than other public employees); see also O’Brien v. DiGrazia, 544
F.2d 543, 546 (1st Cir. 1976) (finding that police officers have a lessened expectation
of privacy in their financial records because the public interest in the integrity of the
police force outweighed the officers’ privacy expectations).
104. See Hornberger v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 799 A.2d 566, 594 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2002) (quoting Rawlings v. Police Dep’t of Jersey City, 627 A.2d 602, 605
(N.J. 1993)) (stating that, as a police officer, the plaintiff had a diminished expectation
of privacy); Hart v. City of Jersey City, 706 A.2d 256, 259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998) (“[P]olice officers, because they occupy positions of public trust and exercise
special powers, have a diminished expectation of privacy.”).
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Supreme Court has also held that police officers who are “on-duty,
searching a vehicle on a public street, cannot expect the same level of
privacy as private citizens in a private place.”105 Maryland courts have also
affirmed the rule that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
statements that the person “knowingly exposes to the public.”106
Hence, there is no expectation of privacy in an on-duty police officer’s
interactions with citizens because all statements that on-duty police officers
make to private citizens in public spaces are knowingly exposed to the
public.107 Moreover, police officers make on-duty statements knowing that
the statements are being exposed to the public because such statements
made between a police officer and a citizen during the course of an arrest
are often used as evidence during any subsequent court proceedings—
which are public record—related to the arrest.108 Therefore, wiretapping
laws requiring an expectation of privacy should not protect officers acting
in their public capacity because police have no reasonable expectation of
privacy due to the public nature of their jobs.
F. Enforcing Wiretapping Statutes Without a Privacy Requirement
Burdens First Amendment Rights.
The First Amendment grants all U.S. citizens (and resident aliens) not
only freedom of speech and expression but also the right to gather
information.109 When courts interpret wiretapping statutes in the same
manner as the Massachusetts statute, there is great potential for unanimous
consent statutes to burden this right.110 Although some courts recognize the
105. Hornberger, 799 A.2d at 594.
106. See Malpas v. State, 695 A.2d 588, 595-96 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (holding

that defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the argument that took
place in defendant’s own home but was audible and recorded without amplification in a
neighbor’s apartment).
107. Cf. Letter from Robert N. MacDonald to Samuel I. Rosenberg, supra note 68,
at 5-6 (on file with author) (contemplating a situation in which a police officer could
not be charged with a wiretapping violation for recording a traffic stop and arguing that
it seems just as likely that the same logical process would be applied to a private
citizen).
108. See id. at 6 (arguing that all citizens know, or should know, that comments
made to police officers are admissible against them in court, and since citizens have no
expectation of privacy in their conversation with police officers, then officers should
have no expectation of privacy either).
109. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (emphasizing that free
speech and free exchange of information are vital to interpreting the First Amendment);
see also Smith v. City of Cummings, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000)
(acknowledging that the First Amendment protects the right to record matters of public
interest as well as gather information about public officials).
110. See Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 977 (Mass. 2001) (Marshall, C.J.
dissenting) (observing that with the court’s current interpretation of the wiretapping
statute, the statute would apply the same standard to Hyde as it would to a member of
the press, which is problematic because freedom of the press is a guaranteed right).
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right to gather information (specifically on public officials such as police
The Supreme Judicial Court of
officers), it is not universal.111
Massachusetts seems motivated by a desire to guarantee equal privacy
rights to both private citizens and police officers under the Fourth
Amendment.112 However, even assuming police have the same expectation
of privacy as private citizens, the Court’s misplaced emphasis upon on-duty
police officers’ Fourth Amendment privacy rights causes the Court to
inexplicably overlook the effect on the First Amendment right to gather
information.113 By reading the Massachusetts statute to prohibit the taperecording of police officers to any degree, including secret recording, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts acknowledges and prioritizes the
privacy rights of police above the First Amendment rights of its state’s
citizens.114
Other courts have already weighed the importance of this right against
the police officers’ privacy expectations, holding that the First Amendment
outweighed the Fourth.115 An important logical consequence follows: even
in the unlikely case that courts recognize the need for a reasonable
expectation of privacy calculus and decide the police do have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, courts should still find the laws unconstitutional
when they violate the First Amendment’s preferential treatment.116
Additionally, video evidence is becoming increasingly more important in
cases of alleged police misconduct.117 In Scott v. Harris, the Supreme
Court pronounced the value of video evidence by exclusively relying on it
111. See, e.g., Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333 (recognizing the First Amendment right to
videotape police conduct is subject to reasonable time, manner, and place restrictions);
Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995) (appreciating that the right
to film public officials extends from the First Amendment but that the reach is not
indefinite because of relevant privacy concerns).
112. See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 975-77 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (discussing the
implications of the majority’s holding for protecting privacy rights of police officers
whose privacy rights should actually be protected less vigorously).
113. See id. at 977 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (discussing how nothing in the
decision prevents the court from applying the statute to the press in the same manner as
the court applied it to Hyde, which is potentially an unconstitutional infringement on
First Amendment rights). But see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972)
(stating that the First Amendment will not necessarily invalidate all civil and criminal
statutes that incidentally burden the press).
114. See generally Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 965-70 (refusing to view the statute in terms
of expectations of privacy while paradoxically finding Hyde guilty of invading the
privacy of the police officer).
115. See Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 25 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding Jean
likely to prevail on her claim that posting the illegally obtained recording on
YouTube.com was constitutionally protected speech).
116. See generally id. at 33 (implying that the facts in Jean strongly call into
question the Massachusetts statute and explaining that Jean’s claim of First
Amendment protection was likely valid).
117. See Thurlow, supra note 17, at 809 (reporting that five percent of Americans
believe themselves victims of police abuse).
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in determining that an officer’s actions were reasonable and did not
constitute excessive force.118 The risk of stifling video evidence and
greatly burdening First Amendment rights is further reason courts should
find privacy requirements in wiretapping statutes.
G. The First Amendment Protects the Publication of Illegally Obtained
Recordings of On-Duty Police Officers and Should be Held to Protect the
Making of Such Recordings.
In Jean v. Massachusetts State Police, the First Circuit experienced the
problematic interpretation of the Massachusetts statute.119 The court in
Jean recognized Bartnicki v. Vopper as controlling precedent because the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of “what degree of protection, if any,
the First Amendment provides to speech that discloses the contents of an
illegally-intercepted communication.”120 The Jean court also recognized
that as per the Massachusetts statute, Jean’s conduct might have been
unlawful as she disclosed to others the contents of an oral communication
that she knew had been illegally intercepted, and she arguably participated
with Pechonis in a conspiracy to disclose to others the contents of the
illegally recorded conversation.121
The court in Jean appropriately recognized that the primary issue that the
case needed to address was not whether Jean had violated the
Massachusetts law, but rather whether the First Amendment—in light of
the Supreme Court’s precedential decision in Bartnicki122—permitted
Massachusetts to criminalize the type of conduct in which Jean had
engaged.123
In a similar decision, the Western District of Pennsylvania correctly
118. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007) (finding that video evidence
from the camera inside the defendant’s police cruiser discredited the petitioner’s
version of the alleged excessive police force and holding that the video evidence was
sufficient to resolve the factual issue of excessive force and justify summary
judgment).
119. See Jean, 492 F.3d at 30 (noting that Bartnicki implicated protecting privacy
but here privacy is “virtually irrelevant” because of the circumstances of the recorded
search).
120. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517, 535 (2001) (finding the right to
speak on issues of public importance outweighed the violation of the federal
wiretapping statute that occurred when Vopper played an illegally intercepted
communication on his radio show).
121. Jean, 492 F.3d at 31 (explaining that while this behavior would technically
violate the statute, the determinative question for the court was whether the First
Amendment permitted Massachusetts to criminalize the conduct since Jean obtained
the tape lawfully).
122. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535 (holding that the First Amendment’s shield for
speech that is a matter of public concern trumped the illegal means by which the
information was obtained and made its disclosure lawful).
123. Jean, 492 F.3d at 27.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011

19

BODRI 4/13/11

10/6/2011 12:49:25 PM

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 17

1346

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 19:4

found a privacy requirement in Pennsylvania’s wiretapping law and
dismissed charges against an individual who was arrested after recording
an encounter with police officers on his cell phone.124 Despite the
previously discussed jurisprudence, the court stated that the law is “plainly
underdeveloped” on the issue of whether individuals have First
Amendment protection when video and audio recording on-duty police
officers.125 Federal courts have also suggested there may be some weight
to the notion that privacy is a requirement in wiretapping statutes.126
The First Amendment also contains a provision that gives citizens the
right to petition the government for potential redress when individual rights
have been violated.127 Hyde tried, unsuccessfully, to argue that his
prosecution subsequent to providing the recorded conversation as evidence
of misconduct was the equivalent of holding him criminally liable for
exercising this important constitutional right.128 Despite the Court’s
determination that Hyde had no claim on this matter, the statute’s
application still burdened Hyde’s right because if misconduct had been
found, Hyde’s recording would have been inadmissible because, based on
the Court’s interpretation of the law, it was obtained illegally.129
IV. POLICY ARGUMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Current wiretapping, electronic surveillance, and eavesdropping laws are
insufficient to handle the complicated issues arising from overprotection of
police privacy.130 They are also ill equipped to deal with advances in
124. See Matheny v. Cnty. of Allegheny Pa., CIVA No. 09-1070, 2010 WL
1007859, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2010) (holding that due to an officer’s lack of
reasonable expectation of privacy, the Pennsylvania wiretapping law did not apply in a
case where a police officer was recorded with a cell phone video camera, but taking
odds with Matheny’s assertion that his arrest violated a “clearly established” First
Amendment right to record on-duty police officers).
125. See id. at *6 (explaining that there is insufficient case law on First Amendment
protection afforded to the videotaping of on-duty police officers to provide sufficient
guidelines or “define the contours of the right” clearly enough to find infringement on
Matheny’s right).
126. See Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 212 n.14 (3d Cir. 2005) (suggesting that
photographing or videotaping the police performing their duties on public property may
be an activity that the First Amendment protects).
127. U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing that Congress shall make no law abridging the
people’s right to “petition the Government for a redress of grievances”).
128. Contra Commonwealth v. Hyde, 705 N.E.2d 963, 969 (Mass. 2001)
(suggesting that Hyde was prosecuted for secretly making the recording, not simply for
making the recording itself).
129. See also Carol M. Bast, What’s Bugging You? Inconsistencies and
Irrationalities of the Law of Eavesdropping, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 837, 837-38 (1998)
(providing anecdotal examples of cases where the Court found “linchpin” evidence of
recorded conversations inadmissible because all parties did not consent to the
recording).
130. See Mishra, supra note 16, at 1555 (discussing how current wiretapping laws
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technology, which have made amateur cell phone videographers legion.131
Thanks to the Internet (and specifically websites such as YouTube),
disseminating audio and video recorded on a cell phone or other device has
never been easier.132
Because the right of private citizens to record public officials and police
officers holds public officials such as police officers accountable for their
actions, it is of the utmost importance in an increasingly marginalized
society.133 Very few checks on police misconduct currently exist, and often
suits brought against police for misconduct and civil rights violations come
down to the word of the plaintiff against the word of the police officer.134
Although juries are not supposed to view police officers as any more
credible than private citizens, this generally does not hold true in
practice.135 Additionally, the availability of video evidence in misconduct
suits against the police would help such plaintiffs successfully bring claims
and alleviate the problem of potential juror bias in favor of police
officers.136 The availability of this type of video evidence would also
lessen the load of an already heavily burdened judicial system because
frivolous civil rights lawsuits would be dismissed more easily if
corroborating video evidence existed.137
Furthermore, there is a great potential for the state to selectively enforce
wiretapping laws if courts like the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts allow the laws to apply against citizens recording police
officers.138 It seems rather unlikely that a police officer would arrest a
overprotect police privacy and explaining the need for a rule that prevents
overprotection but still respects the idea that police are entitled to some privacy).
131. See Bast, supra note 129, at 838 (arguing that state wiretapping laws generally
did not anticipate how pervasive portable audio and video recording devices, such as
those found in nearly all cell phones, would become).
132. See Rittgers, supra note 9 (discussing the need to amend Maryland’s
wiretapping law in light of the proliferation of new technologies such as the cell phone
video recorder and the widespread use of the internet as a means for disseminating
information).
133. See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 972 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (illustrating, by the
example of the infamous Rodney King incident, the importance of laws that allow
citizens to record on-duty police and do not hinder their ability to do so).
134. See Mishra, supra note 16, at 1553 (arguing that external checks on police
misconduct are extremely important because they are not subject to intradepartmental
corruption).
135. See id. at 1554 (suggesting that citizens with criminal records are the targets of
police abuse and juries in civil actions brought by such citizens can easily be biased in
favor of the police).
136. Id. at 1554 n.35 (explaining that citizens rarely win civil actions against police
officers without corroborating evidence).
137. See Thurlow, supra note 17, at 808 (discussing how requiring recording of all
police interactions would eliminate the commonly seen “swearing contest” where a
trial becomes an officer’s word against the word of the defendant or plaintiff).
138. See Rittgers, supra note 9 (explaining that allowing this use of wiretapping

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011

21

BODRI 4/13/11

10/6/2011 12:49:25 PM

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 17

1348

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 19:4

citizen who uses a cell phone to record a police officer rescuing a woman
from a purse-snatcher, but if the police officer then decided to use
excessive force in arresting the purse-snatcher, nothing would prevent the
officer from arresting the videographer and preventing the recorded
misconduct from being used against the officer.139 Rather, if police are
allowed to avail themselves of wiretapping laws’ recording protections,
then police are more likely to apply wiretapping laws to arrest people who
are in what is colloquially referred to as “contempt of cop.”140
Since the majority of courts (even in unanimous consent states) have
held wiretapping laws inapplicable to citizens recording police conduct
when the charged citizens eventually have their day in court, one might
question why there is an urgent need to explicitly codify that this use of the
law is not permissible.141 Such need arises because even though the
defendants in these cases eventually have their charges dismissed, the
deterrent effect has still exerted itself.142 Simply the chance of the hassle
and embarrassment of being arrested, coupled with time consuming and
costly litigation, is enough to make someone think twice before trying to
record any kind of police misconduct.143 Citizens should be encouraged to
record on-duty police officers because it holds the officers to a higher level
of accountability for their actions.144 Any law that discourages holding
public officials accountable for their actions is one that is against good
policy and demands legislative intervention.145
V. CONCLUSION
Because all wiretapping statutes should require a reasonable expectation
of privacy, and because police officers have no expectation of privacy in
their public interactions, unanimous consent wiretapping statutes are being
incorrectly used against citizens who record on-duty officers. Additionally,
laws turns civil servants into nothing more than bullies and sends the message that
police are not interested in any transparency in their activities).
139. See id. (showing that even citizens without intent to record a conversation with
a police officer are subject to search and seizure under Maryland’s broad wiretapping
statute if they do surreptitiously record the conversation).
140. See id. (articulating a view of this application of wiretapping laws that is
commonly held in civil rights circles).
141. See Mishra, supra note 16, at 1556 (arguing that although certain states have
made exceptions to their wiretapping laws for citizens recording police, these
exceptions fail to balance police privacy with public interest effectively).
142. Rittgers, supra note 9.
143. Id.
144. See Solove, supra note 14, at 1267-68 (explaining how surveillance in general
is highly effective when used as a tool for maintaining social order).
145. See Mishra, supra note 16, at 1558 (arguing that states such as Massachusetts
should amend their wiretapping laws to allow citizens to record police officers as a
check on police abuse of power).
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this same use of unanimous consent statutes unconstitutionally burdens the
First Amendment right to gather information of public importance. Using
unanimous consent wiretapping laws to prosecute citizens who record onduty police officers is not only bad public policy (as it encourages a lack of
transparency in police activities) but is also incorrect judicial practice as it
goes against established law. The scope of the right to gather information
of public importance must be legislatively clarified to include recording onduty officers. Alternatively, Congress must create a law requiring state
wiretapping laws to conform to the reasonable expectation of privacy
requirement present in the federal statute. If a change is not made, innocent
citizens will continue to be prosecuted under laws that were never intended
to apply to them in the first place.
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